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Abstract: In this paper, we analyse the evolution of China’s debt structure in terms of a 
new comprehensive debt dataset and then identify the determinants of China’s debt 
structure using stepwise multivariate regression; furthermore, employing a fiscal space 
framework and DSR approach, we assess the sustainability of China’s domestic and 
external debt. The empirical results suggest that first, China’s GDP growth rate, the 
borrowing costs and the financial markets’ development are key common determining 
factors for China’s debt structure; second, the highly indebted local governments and 
non-financial corporations could lead to potential risks for China’s financial stability. 
Nevertheless, China’s debt by sector is sound and sustainable in the near and medium 
term.   
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China’s Debt: Structure, Determinants and Sustainability 
 
1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2008 and the European sovereign debt crisis have ignited 
growing research interest in the credit bubble and debt problem worldwide. Against this 
backdrop, China’s debt problem has also attracted considerable concern, inasmuch as 
China’s economic stimulus package implemented for weathering the global financial crisis 
has significantly expanded the leverage, particularly in the local government sector and 
the private sector. However, empirical studies on China’s debt issues have been 
constrained by the lack of a detailed debt database covering long series and wide 
categories. In this paper, first, we collect debt data for China from all possible sources to 
construct a comprehensive debt dataset for China. Our debt dataset covers nearly all debt 
categories and spans the longest time periods until now. Second, we analyse the evolution 
of the debt structure in China since 1985. Third, we seek to examine various determinants 
of the debt structure and uncover their policy implications. Finally, we investigate the 
sustainability of China’s debt in every sector in terms of international standards and 
various approaches. 
Our main contributions are that our debt dataset for China tracks the development of 
all categories of China’s debt, including public debt, non-financial private debt and 
financial debt domestically, and the external debt to the rest of the world. Based on this 
debt data set, we have introduced a set of indicators to describe and explain China’s debt 
structure and its evolution from multiple perspectives. Employing stepwise multivariate 
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regression, we have identified certain important macroeconomic and policy factors, 
financial factors, institutional factors, and international factors that are the main 
determinants of China’s debt structure and its evolution. We have estimated the long-run 
and the maximum sustainable debt levels of China’s public debt and evaluated the 
sustainability of public debt in China within a fiscal space framework. Using the debt 
service ratio approach, we have assessed the sustainability of China’s non-financial private 
debt. The sustainability of the financial sector debt and the external debt have also been 
analysed using universal approaches. Our empirical results suggest that China’s domestic 
debt (except the non-financial firm sector) and external debt are sound and sustainable in 
the near and medium term. Nevertheless, policymakers and regulators should focus more 
on the highly indebted local governments, non-financial firms and shadow banks.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. 
Section 3 describes China’s debt data in details. Section 4 analyses the debt structure in 
China. Section 5 studies the determinants and implications of the debt structure. Section 6 
examines the sustainability of all sorts of debt in China. Section 7 provides the remarks 
and the conclusion.  
2. Literature Review 
Historically, economic and financial crises are closely connected with excess indebtedness 
and the defaults of the public and private sectors. Excess indebtedness often triggers a debt 
crisis, currency crisis and financial distress on the one hand; the bailouts of government on 
the financial sector during the crisis and the expanding expenditures of the government for 
enhancing the aggregate demand after the crisis increase the public debt level on the other 
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hand. Therefore, a sustainable debt level is a key factor for preventing financial distress 
and promoting stable economic growth. As the international regulator of the financial 
markets, IMF has compiled and published many guidelines and papers on the assessments 
of public debt sustainability for advanced countries, emerging countries and low income 
countries (IMF(2002), IMF (2003a,b), IMF(2010), IMF(2011), IMF (2013). Notably, a 
handbook by Burnside (2005) provides many useful approaches and instruments for fiscal 
sustainability analysis. Ostry et al. (2010) and Ghosh et al. (2011) developed a “fiscal 
space” framework for conducting public debt sustainability analysis by using estimated 
fiscal response functions and the concepts of a long-run debt level and a maximum 
sustainable debt level. In addition, in accordance with the framework of fiscal space, IMF 
(2011) has provided a range of 49 to 58% for the long-run debt level and 63 to 78% for the 
maximum sustainable debt level by re-estimating public debt thresholds for a sample of 
Emerging Markets (EM) for the 1993–2009 period. Although no standard approach exists 
for assessing the private debt sustainability, the destabilising effects of excessive 
indebtedness build-ups in the private sector have been recognized in theory and practice 
(for example, the debt-deflation hypothesis by Fisher (1932); and the recent study by 
Clemons and Vague (2012)). Literature regarding China’s debt sustainability analysis is 
scarce, except that the sustainability of local government debt in China has recently 
attracted much attention (Zhang et al. (2014), Lu and Sun (2013)).  
 Debt structure and its evolution play important roles in debt sustainability analysis. 
However, there have been very few research studies conducted on the evolution of 
domestic government debt and domestic private debt in emerging markets. Missale (1999) 
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conducted a comprehensive study of the structure of domestic government debt in OECD 
countries.  Cowan et al. (2006) examined the evolution of sovereign debt in the Americas. 
Claessens, et al. (2003) studied the role of institutional and macroeconomic factors in 
explaining the currency composition of government bonds. Guscina (2008) employed the 
new Jeanne-Guscina EM Debt Database 2006 to analyse the evolution of sovereign debt 
structure in emerging market countries, where certain important determinants of sovereign 
debt structures are identified for emerging markets. The prior literature on the structure of 
external debt in emerging markets primarily focused on two aspects: the maturity structure 
(Blanchard and Missale (1994), Rodrik and Velasco (1999)) and the currency composition 
(Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), and Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003)). 
Most prior studies did not cover China, except the cross-country panel analysis by Gusina 
(2008), which did not reach far back in time and provided minimal information that 
exclusively involved China’s debt structure. Motivated by this, we conduct a detailed 
investigation on China’s debt structure, determinants and its sustainability in this paper. 
3. China’s Debt Dataset  
Due to the limitation and incompleteness of data released by China’s authorities, we exert 
considerable efforts to collect China’s debt data from every possible source including 
official publications and individual literature. We combine a number of other datasets and 
information from original sources. These include the databases from IMF, BIS, World 
Bank, China’s Statistical Authorities, regarding academic papers, and consultant reports. 
Therefore, we must extend certain data by statistical technique to complete the dataset.  
    The first part of our data set focuses on the public debt at the general government 
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level, which consists of the central government and local governments. The central 
government debt data (domestic and external) after 2005 were compiled from the official 
publication by the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (NBSC 
hereafter), and IMF’s historical public debt database. The data prior to 2005 for the central 
government debt were collected from Lin (2010). The local government debt data were 
compiled from several sources: the recent data for the 2010-2013 period are linked to the 
Audit Findings on China’s Local Governmental Debts (2010) and the Audit Findings on 
China’s Local Governmental Debts (2013) by National Audit Office of the People’s 
Republic China (hereafter NAOC); the data between 2000 and 2009 were available from 
Goodstadt (2014); the data for 1999 were estimated by the author; and the data for the 
1996-1998 period were not available until now. Prior to 1996, because China’s central 
government and local government shared the mutual tax revenue, the debt data were 
consolidated, and the central government debt level is taken as the general government 
debt level. 
    The second part of our data set involves the debt in the non-financial private sector, 
which is composed of household debt and non-financial corporate debt.  The total private 
non-financial sector debt data were collected from the Bank for International Settlement 
database (hereafter BIS, 2013), titled as the “Long series on total credit and domestic bank 
credit to the private nonfinancial sector” database. In addition to BIS (2013), other 
databases were employed for collecting household debt and non-financial corporate debt, 
for example, Clemons and Vague (2012) for the period after 2004 and He et al. (2012) for 
the 1999-2004 period. The household debt data for the 1986-1998 period were estimated 
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by the difference between the total non-financial private debt and the non-financial 
corporate debt. The non-financial corporate debt data for the 1985-1998 period were 
proxied by the total loans to businesses from the database of the People’s Bank of China 
(hereafter the PBC, China’s Central Bank).  
    The third part of our dataset concentrates on financial sector debt. In accordance with 
the definition by MGI (Mckinsey Global Institute, 2015), the financial sector debt covers 
the commercial papers, loans and bonds issued by banks and other parts of the financial 
sector, excluding the interbank borrowings. The data source is China’s CEInet Statistics 
Database (hereafter CEIN). 
The fourth part of our data set provides data regarding China’s international debt, 
which is composed of central government external debt, private non-financial sector 
external debt and financial sector external debt. We collected the data from the database of 
China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the Global Financial Development 
Database (hereafter GFDD) of the World Bank, and the database of NSBC.  
4. Styled Facts about the Structure of China’s Debt 
Prior to the global financial crisis of 2008, researchers mainly focused on international 
debt problems because most currency crises during the last century resulted from the 
defaults of the lower income and developing countries in the international debt markets. 
The international financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis have turned the 
focus towards domestic public debt and private debt. In addition, certain economists 
stressed that certain major financial crises are preceded by a run up in private debt, rather 
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than in public debt
2
. Because the debt level and the debt structure (shares) have significant 
implications for both economic stability and financial stability, in this section, using our 
new China’s debt dataset, we describe and summarize the size and structure of China’s 
debt in terms of borrowers, maturity and currency. 
The shares of China’s aggregate debt level in 2007 and 2013 are summarised in 
Figure 1, which indicates that the debt shares changed minimally from 2007 to 2013 
except for those of the financial sector and of the shadow banks; the latter increased 
dramatically and ignited concerns recently. Most importantly, China’s total debt is 
dominated by the domestic debt from 1985 to 2013; the external debt represents less than 
5% for the same period with a downward trend. 
             Figure 1 Shares of China’s debt at the end of 2007 and 2013 
  
  
Source: Author’s Dataset 
                                                             
2
 Refer to, for example, Clemons and Vague (2012). 
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China’s aggregate debt level was not significant until the midterm of 2008. At 143.88% 
of GDP and 242.33% of GDP, respectively, in 2007, the domestic non-financial debt and 
the total debt (including the financial sector and the external sector) are lower than that in 
most emerging markets and developed economies
3
. Since then, both have increased 
dramatically. The two ratios had attained 215.38% and 337.65%, respectively, by the end 
of 2013 (Figure 3), with an annual average growth rate of approximately 12%, which is 
higher than most other important economies. Figure 2 depicts the aggregate debt by sector 
from 1985 to 2013. Figure 3 exhibits the change in the ratios of debt to nominal GDP 
(hereafter NGDP) by sector from 1985 to 2013. 
Figure 2 China’s debt by sector (Unit: 100 Million RMB Yuan) 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
In Figure 3, the public debt-to-GDP ratio and the external debt-to-NGDP ratio were 
relatively lower and flatter over the sample period, whereas the non-financial private 
                                                             
3
, Refer to, for example, the MGI Report (2015) on the ratios of overall debt to nominal GDP across countries. 
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debt-to -NGDP ratio and the financial sector debt-to-NGDP ratio were relatively higher 
and steeper over the same period. Moreover, the two latter ratios have been rising at 
accelerated rates since 1985. 
Figure 3 Evolutions in ratios of debt to nominal GDP (percentage) by sector 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
China’s aggregate debt contains public debt, non-financial private debt, financial 
sector debt (including shadow banking debt) and international debt by sector. In the 
following, we provide a detailed description on the structures of China’s debt.  
China’s public debt includes central government debt and local government debt. 
These debt sources are combined as the general government debt according to the 
definition by IMF. Figure 4 depicts the evolution of central government debt and local 
government debt from 1985 to 2013. At the end of 2013, China’s public debt attained 
8674.69 billion yuan at the central government level and 12143.65 billion yuan at the local 
government level. The central government debt in 2013 is 1.67 times the level in 2007 and 
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
400.00
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
Public Debt/NGDP Domestic Financial Debt/NGDP
Domestic Private Non-financial Debt/NGDP Total Domestic Debt/NGDP
Total external debt/NGDP Total Debt/NGDP
11 
 
283.3 times the level in 1985, growing annually at an average growth rate of 30.33%. The 
local government debt has soared since 2007 and grown annually at an average growth 
rate of approximately 45% since 1997! Since 2009, the local government debt level has 
exceeded the central government debt level. The rapid increase in local government debt 
has recently led to more attention from the inside and outside.  The evolutions in the 
ratios of government debt to nominal GDP and to the fiscal revenues are shown in Figure 
5 in which we find that both the ratio of public debt to national fiscal revenue and the ratio 
of central government debt to central fiscal revenue nearly remain above 150% since 1999. 
This implies a potential risk for financial stability in China. In addition, the ratio of local 
government debt to local fiscal revenue has exceeded 150% since the global financial 
crisis of 2008. This finding could result in loan defaults at local government level. 
Nevertheless, given the 35.4% of nominal GDP, China’s public debt remains low by 
international standards
4
. Notably, in Figure 5, the dramatic decrease in the ratio of the 
public debt level to the central government revenue from 1993 to 1994 is due to the 
remarkable increase in the central government revenue in1994, which is the consequence 
of the reform in the tax system in 1993. Prior to 1993, the general government tax revenue 
was shared by the central government and the local government. Since 1993, the tax 
distribution reform was implemented, and the central government and the local 
government have collected tax revenues separately. The new tax assignment system 
quadrupled the central government fiscal revenue in 1994 compared with that in 1993 and 
reduced the local fiscal revenue by approximately 25% in 1994.  
      
                                                             
4
 The average ratio of public debt in OECD countries is above 100% in the same year.  
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Figure 4 Central government debt and local government debt  
(Unit: 100 million yuan RMB) 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
Figure 5 Changes in Ratios of public debts to GDP and fiscal revenues (percentage) 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
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2013 are plotted in Figure 6, which indicates that nearly all of the ratios of local debt to 
local GDP are lower than 50%, except that of Guizhu province (57.16%). Note that the 
ratio of local debt to local fiscal revenue is significantly high in many provinces, 
particularly for Qinghai (332.72%), Hainan (218.33%), Guizhou (383.17%), Yunnan 
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These provinces with the ratio of debt to fiscal revenue greater than 200% would be 
accorded more concerns by the regulators. Given that China’s local government revenues 
heavily rely on land sales and extensively use off-balance sheet local government financial 
platforms (LGFPs: Local government financing platforms)
5
, which are unstable and 
unsustainable, local governments should transform their fiscal models and seek more 
reliable revenue sources to reduce debt accumulations and repayment burdens. 
Figure 6 Debt/GDP and debt/fiscal revenues ratios by region, June 2013 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
                                                             
5
 Refer to, for example, the research conclusions from the MGI Report (2015), Wu (2014).  
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   China’s non-financial private debt, consisting of household debt and non-financial 
corporate debt, has remained on an uptrend since the 1990s. Household debt has increased 
approximately 148 times since 1985 and nearly quadrupled from 2007 to 2013, rising 
from 133.45 billion yuan in 1985 to 19850 billion yuan in 2013. Non-financial corporate 
debt has increased nearly 167 times since 1985 and nearly tripled from 2007 to 2013, 
rising from 474.68 billion yuan in 1985 to 79646 billion yuan in 2013 (Figure 7).  
      Figure 7 Household debt, non-financial corporate debt (Unit, 100 Million Yuan) 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
    Figure 8 presents the changes in the ratios of household debt to disposable income, 
and of non-financial corporate debt to non-financial corporate annual revenue and of total 
non-financial private debt to nominal GDP.  The non-financial private debt-to-NGDP 
ratio had tripled by the end of 2013, attaining 180% of NGDP. Driven by the increase in 
mortgage volumes, the ratio of household debt to household disposable income rose from 
26.34% in 1985 to 78.43% in 2013. The leverage in the corporate sector has increased 
steadily since 1999, rising from 50% (to GDP) in 1985 to 140% in 2013, which is one of 
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the highest levels of corporate debt in the world.  
     Figure 8 Evolutions in ratios of non-financial private debt to income (percentage) 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
 
In accordance with the definition of MGI (2015), China’s financial sector debt was 
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st
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shadow banks debt has increased 17 times for the same period. The recent rapid growth of 
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Figure 9 Financial (Banks mainly) sector debt and shadow banking debt 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
Figure 10 exhibits the debt-to-asset ratio in the financial sector and the debt-to-NGDP 
ratios in the financial sector and in the shadow banking. The financial sector debt-to-assets 
ratio decreased 10% during the past decade, which reflects the modification of assets 
quality and the steady reduction in the non-performing loans (NPL) in China’s banking 
industry. The shadow banks debt-to-NGDP ratio has increased approximately 7 times 
since the global financial crisis of 2008. The rapid rise in the debt-to-NGDP ratio for the 
financial sector, particularly for the shadow banks, has important implications for financial 
stability.  
Figure 10 Debt-to-assets ratio and debt-to-NGDP ratios for the financial sector 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
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In particular, China’s shadow banking is less complicated than that in advanced 
economies. China’s shadow banking does not involve long intermediation chains, multiple 
layers of securitization, or highly leveraged players, and most loans involve a single 
intermediary and minimal or no leverage or currency risk according to the MGI report 
(2015). However, the debt-to-NGDP ratio of China’s shadow banks increased 
approximately 7 times after the global financial crisis of 2008, attaining 23% in 2013. Due 
to the non-transparency, potential contagious effects to the official banking sector, and 
speculation motives, China’s regulators should be cautious of the shadow banking 
development.   
It is well known that international debt has played an important role in promoting 
China’s rapid economic development beginning in 1978. Nevertheless, the external 
borrowings have been strictly controlled and remain a small proportion of China’s debt. 
The ratio of external debt to nominal GDP has never exceeded 17%, attaining the peak in 
1994 at 16.24% and the lowest point in 2013 at 8.91%. Importantly, the share of 
short-term external debt in overall external debt had grown to 78.39% by 2013, and the 
ratio of short-term external debt to national annual fiscal revenue has increased from 12% 
to 31% since 1990 (Figure 11).  
The increase in the share of short-term external debt in total external debt has pros and 
cons. The increase can reduce the financial costs on the one hand but raise the rollover risk, 
particularly under an unstable macroeconomic environment, on the other hand. Fortunately, 
both the ratios of short-term external debt to NGDP and to national fiscal revenue are 
lower in China compared with the international criteria. 
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Fig.11 Shares of external debt and ratios of external debt to fiscal revenue and NGDP (%) 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
 
5. Determinants of China’s Debt Structure 
In this section, we identify the determinants of China’s debt structure by using the 
multivariate regression (OLS). To avoid the multicollinearity problems, we choose the 
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national fiscal revenue (RPDNF), ratio of central government debt to central government 
fiscal revenue (RCGDCF), ratio of local government debt to local government fiscal 
revenue (RLGDLF), ratio of non-financial private debt to GDP (RNPG), ratio of 
household debt to disposable income (RHDDI), ratio of non-financial corporate debt to 
non-financial corporate revenue (RCDCR), ratio of financial sector debt to GDP (RFDG), 
ratio of financial sector debt to financial sector asset (RFDFA), ratio of shadow banking 
debt to GDP (RSBDG), share of short term external debt in total external debt (SSEDT), 
and ratio of short-term external debt to national fiscal revenue (RSEDNF). Table 1 in 
Appendix A summarizes the explained structural indicators of China’s debt and data 
sources.  
The set of independent variables for explaining China’s debt structure is classified 
into four groups: macroeconomic and policy indicators, financial indicators, institutional 
indicators, and international trade indicators.  
The macroeconomic and policy indicators consist of the growth rate of GDP (GGDP), 
growth rate of M2 (GM2), interest rate (IR), growth rate of CPI (PI), growth rate of capital 
formation (GCA), growth rate of urban infrastructure (GINFRA), real estate property 
index (REPI), and the ratio of government spending to fiscal revenue (GY). The exchange 
rate is not adopted because China had a fixed exchange rate regime for a long time. Since 
May, 2005, the fixed system has been replaced by a floating system; however, it is a 
manipulate floating.  
The financial indicators are composed of the ratio of total deposits to GDP (RDGDP), 
ratio of total loans to GDP (RLGDP), Shanghai stock market index (SSINDEX), and the 
20 
 
financial crisis dummy (FC). The latter takes the value of 1 at 1990 (Asia Financial Crisis), 
1998 (China’s Bank Crisis6), and 2008 (Global financial crisis) and 0 at other years. 
The institutional indicators contain the GINI coefficient (GINI), Governing efficiency 
of China’s government (GOVERN), control of corruption indicator (CCORI), and the 
government succession dummy (GSD), which takes the value of 1 at 1997 (Deng’s 
concession), 2001(Jiang’s concession), and 2012 (Hu’s concession) and takes 0 at other 
years. 
The international trade indicators include the growth rate of FDI (GFDI), ratio of 
total export and import to GDP (REGDP), and ratio of foreign reserve to GDP (RFRGDP).  
Table 2 in Appendix A exhibits the abovementioned explanatory variables for 
analysing the determinants of debt structure in China. The data are sourced from the China 
Economic Information Networks (CEIN) database, Wind database (WIND), and the World 
Wide Governance Indicators (2014) by World Bank (WGI). The identified determinants 
for China’s debt structure are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix A.   
A. Common Determinants of China’s Debt Structure Indicators 
The results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that nearly every indicator of China’s debt structure 
is significantly influenced by the growth rate of GDP and the interest rate. Generally, the 
ratios of public debt and private debt to GDP are negatively correlated with the growth of 
GDP, implying that these ratios rise when the growth rate of China’s economy falls. 
However, the growth rate of GDP has positive effects on the ratios of the central 
government and the local government debt to their fiscal revenues. The increase in the 
                                                             
6
 This is identified by Laeven and Valencia (2008).  
21 
 
interest rate is followed by the decrease in the ratios of public debt and of the financial 
sector debt to GDP. This result is justified by the fact that the rise in interest rate increases 
the borrowing costs and thereby reduces the borrowing. Interestingly, the share of 
non-financial private debt and the share of financial sector debt in domestic debt, as well 
as the ratio of household debt to household disposable income are positively correlated 
with the interest rate. The first two positive relations could be explained by the remarkable 
decline in the share of the public debt in the domestic debt when the interest rate rises. 
The third importantly influential indicator for China’s debt structure is the 
development of China’s banking system (proxied by the ratio of total deposits and total 
loans to GDP). The positive correlations indicate that a wider and deeper Chinese banking 
system stimulates the credit because the development in the banking sector increases the 
channels and the availability of borrowing.   
B. Determinants of China’s Public Debt Structure Indicators 
In addition to the growth rate of GDP, the interest rate, and financial development, the 
governing efficiency has a positive impact on the share of public debt in the domestic debt; 
we did not find correlations between the real estate prosperity index and the ratio of local 
government debt to the local fiscal revenue. The ratio of the foreign exchange reserve to 
GDP as the assets of the government in China is significantly positively related to the ratio 
of public debt to GDP. The rate of inflation positively affects the share of public debt in 
domestic debt, the ratio of public debt to GDP and the ratio of central government debt to 
the central government fiscal income, which implies the effects of monetary policy on the 
debt ratios and distributions of debt burdens. The government spending has negative 
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impacts on both the share of domestic debt and the share of public debt in total debt. The 
growth of investment is negatively correlated with the ratio of external debt to GDP and 
positively related to the share of domestic debt. Specifically, the financial crisis dummy 
has a positive effect on the ratio of local government to local fiscal revenue. Finally and 
importantly, the government succession has minimal impact on the public debt structure 
indicators in China. 
C. Determinants of China’s Non-Financial Private Debt Structure 
Our regression results show that the financial development indicator (proxied by the ratio 
of total deposits and loans to GDP) is a key factor in determining the non-financial private 
debt structure.  The depth and breadth of the banking system regulate the development in 
private debt market. The Gini coefficient has a positive impact on the ratio of the 
household debt to household disposable income, which suggests that the inequality in the 
income distribution increases the household leverage ratio in China. That the income 
equality helps reduce the household leverage level has important implications for China’s 
economic development strategy. The rate of inflation is negatively correlated with the ratio 
of household debt to the disposable income. For the non-financial corporate debt and the 
overall non-financial private debt, the growth of capital accumulation (investment) is an 
important determinant. The financial crisis dummy is positively related to the share of 
non-financial private debt in domestic debt and negatively related to the ratio of 
non-financial private debt to GDP. It is reasonable that the rise in the growth rate of FDI 
reduces the share of non-financial private debt in domestic debt.  
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D.  Determinants of China’s Financial Sector Debt Structure 
It is not surprising that the share of financial sector debt in domestic debt is positively 
correlated with the real estate property index, which supports the empirical evidence that 
the loans from the banking sector are closely correlated with the development in the house 
construction in China. The growth of capital accumulation (investment) is positively 
connected with the ratio of financial sector debt to GDP and the ratio of financial sector 
debt to the assets. The correlations of the rate of inflation and the growth rate of M2 with 
the share of financial debt in domestic debt and the ratio of financial sector debt to 
financial sector assets prove that China’s monetary policy has an important impact on the 
growth of credit in China (the credit channel). Interestingly, the financial crisis dummy has 
negative effects on the ratio of financial sector debt to GDP, and the corruption control 
ability of the Chinese government positively influences the leverage ratio of the financial 
sector.  
   Regarding the specific determinants of shadow banking debt, we find that the growth 
rate of broad money is negatively correlated with the ratio of shadow banking debt to GDP, 
uncovering the fact that the private sector will seek credit from the shadow banks when a 
contractionary monetary policy is implemented. The negative correlation between the 
financial crisis dummy and the ratio of shadow banking debt to GDP indicates that 
financial crises reduce loans from shadow banks.   
E. Determinants of China’s International Debt Structure 
Without doubt, in addition to the growth rate of GDP, the foreign exchange reserve is a 
key determinant in China’s external debt. Both the ratio of international debt to GDP and 
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the share of short-term external debt in the total external debt are positively correlated 
with the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to GDP. In particular, our empirical results 
indicate that the international trade has minimal impact on the external debt ratios in 
China. 
6. The Sustainability of China’s Debt 
Sustainable debt often refers to that which can be serviced by the current issuer and in the 
future without adjustment. The sustainability of public debt is also defined as fiscal 
sustainability, which is a traditional and official focus on debt sustainability analysis 
(DSA). In this section, we test and assess not only the fiscal sustainability but also the 
non-financial private debt sustainability and the external debt sustainability.  
Prodigious literature on the DSA of public debt exists. In accordance with the IMF 
(2011) and Ostry (2010), we conduct our evaluation on China’s public debt sustainability 
within the fiscal space framework. On the sustainability of non-financial private debt in 
China, we employ the debt service ratio approach.  
A. Assessment on the Sustainability of China’s Public Debt 
Our methodology to assess the sustainability of China’s public debt is in accordance with 
the IMF (2011), Ghosh et al. (2011), Ostry et al. (2010), and Abiad and Ostry (2005) in 
which a fiscal space framework has been developed. Two concepts of the sustainable level 
of public debt are defined in the fiscal space framework: the long-run debt level and the 
maximum sustainable debt level. The former is the level to which the debt-to-GDP ratio 
converges in the long run, the latter is the level beyond which a debt distress event is 
likely or inevitable. 
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In this subsection, first, we estimate the fiscal response function for China, by which 
we calculate the long-run sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio and the maximum sustainable 
debt-to-GDP ratio. Second, we compare China’s public debt structure indicators with these 
sustainable thresholds and judge the sustainability of China’s public debt.  
The long-run sustainable public debt (percentage to GDP) is defined by 
        *
*
,
pb
d
r g


                            (1) 
where *d  is the long-run debt level (percentage to GDP), pb  is the historical 
average primary balance (percentage to GDP), *r  is the historical average risk-free 
interest rate, and g  is the historical average growth rate of GDP.  
Given that the historical average risk-free interest rate is 5.30 for the 1985-2013 
period, and the historical average growth rate of GDP for the same period is 9.93, equation 
(1) produces: 4.63 *pb d  , in terms of which the long-run sustainable debt is 
obtained.          .  
A fiscal reaction function in the fiscal gap framework is given by  
        1( )t t t tpb f d x                        (2) 
where ( )x t  is a vector of control variables capturing all systematic determinants of 
the primary balance other than lagged debt, 1( )tf d   is the response of the primary 
balance to lagged debt, which is a continuous function, and ( )t  is an i.i.d. shock to the 
primary balance.  
For the determinant case, the maximum sustainable debt level can be obtained by the 
higher intersection between 1( )t tx f d   and 
*( ) tr g d  schedule:  
*
1( ) ( )t t tx f d r g d                     (3) 
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The lower solution to (3) is also defined as the long-run sustainable debt level, in 
contrast to the definition by equation (1).  
Using equations (1) and (3), we can obtain the long-run sustainable public debt level 
and maximum sustainable debt level, in terms of which we assess the sustainability of 
public debt for China.  
Employing equation (1), we obtained that China’s long run sustainable public debt 
ratios (percentage to GDP) are 25.96% and 67.66% at the general government level and 
the local government level, respectively, for the 1985-2013 period. Furthermore, we 
estimated the fiscal reaction functions for China by using the approach suggested by 
Ghosh et al. (2011). The results are presented in Table 5 in Appendix B.  
In estimating China’s fiscal response function, we first employ an H-P filter to 
calculate the output gap and the government expenditure gap. In doing so, the   is taken 
to be 100 due to the annual data frequency. The lagged debt is one period lag. 
The estimated fiscal response functions for China are:  
  2 3
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ0.155 0.021 0.00046 0.0262 0.021t t t t t tpb d d d y g           (4) 
and 
  2 3
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ0.065 0.15 0.00036 0.027 0.097 0.0415 0.565t t t t t t t tpb d d d y g fc           (5) 
    where tpb  denotes the primary balance at the general government level (percentage 
to GDP) at time t , ˆty  denotes the output gap, ˆ tg  represents the government 
expenditure gap, t  is the rate of inflation, and tfc  denotes the financial crisis dummy. 
Combining equation (3) and the estimated fiscal response equations (4) and (5) 
(detailed in Table 5), we estimate the maximum sustainable debt level, which is 77.27% or 
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93.43% for the two specified fiscal response functions, respectively.  
    Given that China’s public debt level (percentage to GDP) is 35% in 2013, which is 
located in the sustainable scope [25.96% 93.43%], it is a reasonable conclusion that 
China’s public debt at the general and local government levels is sustainable at the 
moment and in the near and medium future. Moreover, the fiscal space (58.43%) for China 
is significantly larger than other advanced economies and emerging countries. This 
provides a large space for China public debt adjustments in the future.  
   We consider the contingent liabilities of China’s government, which include the 
potential costs associated with nonfinancial SOE debt; policy banks’ liabilities; fiscal costs 
of recapitalizing banks, and liabilities of state-owned asset management companies
7
. 
According to the estimation by Li et al. (2012), the contingent liabilities were 
approximately 100 percent of GDP in 2010 in China; hence the overall ratio of public debt 
to GDP at that moment could exceed the maximum sustainable debt level (93.43%). 
Obviously, this implies a potential vulnerability to China’s debt sustainability.   
       B. Assessment on the Sustainability of Non-Financial Private Debt 
No standard threshold level has been developed for the DSA of non-financial private debt; 
we employ the debt service ratio (DSR) to examine the sustainability of non-financial 
private sector indebtedness. The DSR measures household (firm) debt-servicing costs as a 
percentage of its disposable income (revenue). In accordance with Drehmann and Juselius 
(2012), we calculate the DSR by 
           / ,
[1 (1 ) ]t
t t
t t t M
t t
I D
DSR DSC Y
I Y

 
 
                      (6) 
                                                             
7
 Refer to, for example, Zhang and Barnett (2014).  
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where tD  is an aggregate borrowing stock, tI  is the average interest rate per year 
on the stock, tM  denotes the average remaining maturity in years in the stock and tY  
denotes annual aggregate income. tI  is given by 
      
1 ( 1 ) ( ) ,
m
t t tI I I                                   (7) 
beginning with the initial value
0 0
mI I   . In equation (7),   is set as 0.8 
following Drehmann and Juselius (2012), and m
tI  denotes the short-term interest rate.  
For simplicity, we assume the average maturity for household debt to be 10 years, 
and the average maturity for non-financial corporate debt to be 3 years. The banking 
lending rate is used to calculate the debt service costs for both sectors. The results are 
reported in Table 6 in Appendix B. 
In Table 6, we find that the DSRs for households are lower than 10.5% from 1985 to 
2013; this suggests that a majority of Chinese households have comfortable or modest 
debt burdens. The DSRs for Chinese non-financial firms are between 20% and 50% during 
the sample period, which implies comparatively heavy burdens for non-financial firms. It 
needs to be stressed that these are average estimations; the potential vulnerabilities of 
non-financial private debt from the tail distribution are ignored.  
Notwithstanding that the ratio of the debt-to-disposal income for households has 
increased dramatically since 2000 (from 6.62% in 2000 to 78.43% in 2013), the current 
ratio of 78% remains far lower than the average level of 110% in advanced countries, but 
higher than the average level of 42% in emerging countries
8
. In addition, the modest DSRs 
and the lower ratios of household debt to financial assets (less than 30% from 2004 by 
                                                             
8
 According to the MGI report (2015), these data are for 2014  
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Table 6) ensure the sustainability of household debt in China. 
Although the debt burdens (by DSR) of China’s non-financial corporations have 
declined since 1998 from the peak of 50%, it remains close to 30% in 2013. In addition to 
the heavy debt service burdens, the non-financial corporate debt had attained 140% of 
GDP by the end of 2013, which is one of the highest levels across countries. Hence, a 
deleverage process is required and more concerns should be accorded to the potential risk 
from the excess indebtedness of China’s non-financial corporations.  
C. Assessment on the Sustainability of International Debt 
Because the share of the international debt in overall debt in China is very low and 
declines over time, and because China has a huge stock of foreign exchange, fewer 
concerns have been given with the DSA for China’s external debt. According to the IMF 
(2002), the standard thresholds of external debt sustainability indicators include the ratio 
of NPV external debt to exports (the threshold value at 150%) and the ratio of NPV of 
external debt to government revenue (the threshold value at 250%). According to these 
two ratios we conduct the assessment on China’s external debt. The results are presented 
in Table 7 in Appendix B. Although we did not calculate the NPV of China’s external debt 
to exports and government revenue
9
, given that the ratios of short-term debt to exports, 
fiscal revenue and aggregate foreign exchange reserves are 4.93%, 5.24% and 17.71%, 
respectively, in 2013, and the ratios of total external debt to exports, fiscal revenues and 
foreign exchange reserves are 38.18%, 40.54% and 137.09%, respectively, in 2013, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the ratios of nominal external debt to exports and the 
                                                             
9
 This is because the ratios of the external debt to GDP, exports and fiscal revenue are nearly stable and have gradually 
declined since 2005 in China. Refer to Table 7. 
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government revenue are comparatively significantly lower than the international standards 
(150, 250%) for the external debt sustainability. Although China’s current account 
deteriorates and the exchange rate of RMB depreciates in the future, China’s external debt 
burdens would be modest and sustainable in the near and medium term.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
Debt and leverage, whether at the micro or macro level, have important implications to 
economic sustainability and stability. Due to the limitation of historical data, studies on the 
effects and sustainability of China’s debt are scarce. To fill this urgent gap, we collect a 
comprehensive debt data set for China, which covers the entire range of debt categories 
and spans the longest series to our knowledge.  
Relying on the newly constructed debt data set, we have employed a set of indicators 
to describe and explain the structure of China’s debt and its evolution. By using a 
multivariate stepwise regression, we have identified the determinants of China’s debt 
structure. We find that the growth rate of GDP, interest rate, and the depth and extent of 
the financial sector are the most important common determinants of China’s debt structure. 
These developments suggest that sustainable rapid economic growth, easy monetary 
policy and mature financial markets could help improve China’s debt structure. 
Furthermore, our empirical results suggest that the determinants for different debt 
structures by sector are heterogeneous and diverse, which implies diverse policy choices 
for reducing the excess indebtedness in different sectors.   
    By estimating fiscal response functions within a fiscal space framework, we have 
identified the long-run debt level (25.96%) and the maximum sustainable debt level 
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(93.43%) for China’s public debt. China’s practical public debt level (debt-to-GDP percent) 
over time is in between these two values; hence, we can conclude that China’s public debt 
is sustainable in the near and medium term. We employ the debt service ratio to assess the 
sustainability of non-financial private debt. The empirical results indicate that China’s 
household sector has lower and modest debt burdens, whereas the debt burdens for 
non-financial firms are comparatively heavy. Moreover, given 140% of GDP by 2013, 
China’s non-financial corporate debt is one of the highest levels in the world. By using the 
thresholds developed by the IMF, we confirm that China’s external debt is sustainable at 
the moment and in the medium future. In sum, China’s domestic debt (except the 
non-financial firm sector) and external debt are sound and sustainable in the near and 
medium term. Nevertheless, policymakers and regulators should focus on the highly 
indebted local governments, non-financial firms and shadow banks. 
Looking ahead, further studies are necessary for exploring the connection between 
the debt level and China’s economic growth, and the implications of China’s debt to 
China’s economic and fiscal stabilities.  
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Appendix A. Debt Structure Indicators, Determinants, and Data Sources  
Table 1 Explained indicators for analysing China’s debt structure  
Indicators Description of Indicators and Variables Data Source 
RDDG ratio of domestic debt to GDP Author 
REDG ratio of external debt to GDP Author 
SDD share of domestic debt in total debt Author 
SPD share of public debt in domestic debt  Author 
SNPD share of private non-financial debt in domestic debt Author 
SFDD share of financial sector debt in domestic debt Author 
RPDG ratio of public debt to GDP Author 
RPDNF ratio of public debt to national fiscal revenue Author 
RCGDCF ratio of central government debt to central government fiscal revenue Author 
RLGDLF ratio of local government debt to local government fiscal revenue Author 
RNPG ratio of non-financial private debt to GDP  Author 
RHDDI ratio of household debt to disposable income  Author 
RCDCR ratio of non-financial corporate debt to non-financial corporate revenue Author 
RFDG ratio of financial sector debt to GDP Author 
RFDFA ratio of financial sector debt to financial sector asset  Author 
RSBDG ratio of shadow banking debt to GDP Author 
SSEDT share of short term external debt in total external debt  Author 
RSEDNF ratio of short term external debt to national fiscal revenue Author 
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Table 2 Explanatory variables for China’s debt structure analysis 
Type of 
Variables 
Variables Description of Variables and Indicators Data Source 
Macroeconomic 
Condition 
GGDP growth rate of GDP  CEIN 
IR interest rate of deposits WIND 
GM2 growth rate of M2 CEIN 
REPI real estate property index CEIN 
PI growth rate of CPI CEIN 
GY ratio of government spending to fiscal 
revenue 
CEIN 
GCA growth rate of capital formation WIND 
GINFRA growth rate of urban infrastructure WIND 
Financial 
Indicators 
RDGDP ratio of total deposits to GDP CEIN 
RLGDP ratio of total loans to GDP CEIN 
FC Financial crisis dummy Author 
SSINDEX Shanghai stock market index CEIN 
Institutional 
Indicators 
GINI GINI coefficient WIND 
GOVERN governing efficiency of China’s 
government 
WGI 
GSD government succession dummy Author 
CCORI control corruption index WGI 
International 
Indicators 
GFDI growth rate of FDI CEIN 
REGDP ratio of total export and import to GDP CEIN 
RFRGDP ratio of foreign reserve to GDP CEIN 
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Table 3 Empirical Results for Determinants of China’s Public Debt 
 RDDG REDG SDD SPD RPDG RPDNF RCGDCF RLGDLF 
Constant 
 
55.92** 
(28.54) 
9.66 
(11.02) 
100.1*** 
(5.34) 
39.52 
(14.92) 
27.94*** 
(4.275) 
191.89** 
(100.58) 
508.32*** 
(167.43) 
468.04 
(359.18) 
GGDP 
 
-2.12** 
(1.08) 
0.501*** 
(0.193) 
-0.279** 
(0.099) 
-0.22 
(0.150) 
-0.517** 
(0.278) 
-1.097 
(1.789) 
5.85** 
(2.82) 
10.17*** 
(4.28) 
IR 
 
0.245 
(1.30) 
-0.193 
(0.160) 
-0.093 
(0.081) 
-1.75*** 
(0.417) 
-2.49*** 
(0.458) 
-23.17*** 
(3.82) 
-16.98*** 
(4.625) 
-33.88*** 
(15.19) 
GM2 
 
        
PI 
 
   0.37*** 
(0.115) 
0.364** 
(0.185) 
4.044*** 
(1.302) 
  
GCA 
 
 -0.057* 
(0.031) 
0.0335** 
(0.0161) 
     
REPI 
 
       -3.03 
(3.49) 
GY 
 
 0.038 
(0.081) 
-0.074* 
(0.035) 
-0.22*** 
(0.085) 
 
 
   
GINFRA 
 
        
RDGDP 
+RLGDP 
1.137*** 
(0.137) 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
0.0246*** 
(0.006) 
0.0369*** 
(0.014) 
 -0.401*** 
(0.178) 
-0.739*** 
(0.303) 
 
SSINDEX 
 
        
FC 
 
       61.06** 
(29.01) 
GOVERN 
 
   0.201 
(0.144) 
 2.71* 
(1.706) 
-2.53 
(3.258) 
 
CCORI 
 
        
GSD 
 
-10.02 
(8.74) 
 0.250 
(0.377) 
     
GINI 
 
        
GFDI 
 
        
REGDP 
 
-2.067** 
(0.757) 
       
RFRGDP 
 
0.452 
(0.435) 
0.154*** 
(0.042) 
  0.436*** 
(0.062) 
   
Adj. R2 0.945 0.79 0.86 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.37 0.45 
F-Statistic 82.28 14.86 22.79 49.46 97.69 56.47 4.31 3.85 
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       Table 4 Empirical Results for Determinants of China’s Private Debt 
 SNPD RNPG RHDDI RCDCR SFDD RFDG RFDFA RSBDG SSEDT RSEDNF 
Constant 
 
52.84*** 
(11.03) 
53.43** 
(24.82) 
-325.3*** 
(90.20) 
325.23*** 
(35.98) 
12.38 
(12.72) 
137.4*** 
(6.32) 
34.01** 
(0.068) 
114.1** 
(42.99) 
-64.5** 
(28.94) 
20.10 
(6.25) 
GGDP 
 
0.0206 
(0.189) 
-4.50*** 
(1.391) 
-1.435 
(1.423) 
-2.973 
(2.01) 
-0.013 
(0.323) 
-3.27*** 
(0.82) 
0.068 
(0.264) 
-2.27** 
(0.88) 
-0.461 
(1.146) 
3.21* 
(1.68) 
IR 
 
0.299* 
(0.182) 
0.839 
(1.154) 
8.551*** 
(2.301) 
-6.899*** 
(1.684) 
1.29*** 
(0.24) 
-2.70*** 
(0.39) 
-3.06** 
(0.708) 
 1.488 
(1.136) 
-3.108* 
(1.582) 
GM2 
 
      -0.58** 
(0.163) 
-0.646* 
(0.312) 
  
PI 
 
  -1.562* 
(0.749) 
 -0.39*** 
(0.125) 
     
GCA 
 
 0.571** 
(0.246) 
 -1.31* 
(0.620) 
 0.56*** 
(0.138) 
1.05*** 
(0.241) 
   
REPI 
 
0.048 
(0.084) 
 0.950 
(0.689) 
 0.247* 
(0.136) 
  -0.737 
(0.512) 
  
GY 
 
          
GINFRA 
 
          
RDGDP 
+RLGDP 
 0.455*** 
(0.079) 
0.728*** 
(0.098) 
-0.599*** 
(0.129) 
    0.34** 
(0.122) 
0.064 
(0.106) 
SSINDEX 
 
       0.002* 
(0.001) 
 -0.005* 
(0.003) 
FC 
 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
-14.08* 
(7.02) 
  1.151 
(1.436) 
-7.77** 
(4.11) 
 -10.34* 
(4.09) 
-0.658 
(7.27) 
 
GOVERN 
 
         -0.457 
(1.077) 
CCORI 
 
      0.233* 
(0.114) 
   
GSD 
 
          
GINI 
 
  166.50* 
(79.15) 
       
GFDI 
 
-0.337** 
(0.117) 
   -0.222 
(0.023) 
     
REGDP 
 
        0.219 
(0.624) 
0.158 
(0.688) 
RFRGDP         0.733** 
(0.332) 
0.164 
(0.371) 
Adj. R2 0.57 0.83 0.896 0.79 0.60 0.79 0.85 0.82 0.87 0.55 
F-Statistic 6.97 23.90 31.38 18.31 6.68 21.89 12.04 10.66 21.16 4.47 
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Appendix B Empirical Results for Sustainability Analysis 
Table 5 Estimated Fiscal Reaction Function for China 
(Dependent Variable: General Government Primary Balance to GDP (percentage)) 
Independent Variables Specification (1) Specification (2) 
Lagged debt -0.155* # 
(0.098) 
-0.065 
(0.089) 
Lagged debt square 0.021** 
(0.008) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
Lagged debt cubic -0.00046*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.00036** 
(0.00015) 
Output gap## 0.0262** 
(0.0098) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
Government expenditure 
gap## 
-0.091*** 
(0.021) 
-0.097*** 
(0.0115) 
Inflation  0.0415*** 
(0.0144) 
Financial crisis dummy  0.565* 
(0.282) 
Adj. R-square 0.496 0.632 
 Source: author estimation 
 #: standard errors are reported in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance, respectively.  
 ## The gap was estimated by H-P Filter. Lamda is taken as 100. 
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Table 6 Debt service costs for households and firms 
Period 
Household 
debt to 
disposable 
income 
Household 
debt to 
financial 
assets 
Firm 
debt to 
revenue 
Lending 
rate 
DSR for 
households 
DSR for 
non-financial 
Firms 
1985 26.34    60.09  5.76  3.39  21.23  
1986 24.79      8.64  3.60  
 
1987 23.64  
 
  8.64  3.43  
 
1988 21.02      9.00  3.10  
 
1989 19.44  
 
  11.34  3.15  
 
1990 18.08    81.21  10.08  2.78  29.99  
1991 17.48  
 
  10.08  2.69  
 
1992 15.79      8.64  2.29  
 
1993 13.33  
 
  9.36  1.99  
 
1994 10.25      10.98  1.64  
 
1995 8.39  
 
98.27  10.98  1.34  36.63  
1996 7.29    110.43  10.98  1.16  41.16  
1997 6.89  
 
121.29  10.08  1.06  44.79  
1998 6.72    139.43  8.64  0.98  50.73  
1999 6.47  
 
143.06  6.39  0.86  50.87  
2000 6.62    132.34  5.85  0.86  46.80  
2001 18.11  
 
122.20  5.85  2.34  43.21  
2002 25.72    130.63  5.31  3.25  45.94  
2003 32.19  
 
120.62  5.31  4.06  42.42  
2004 38.41  15.62  97.02  5.58  4.91  34.21  
2005 37.95  15.11  82.86  5.58  4.85  29.22  
2006 40.39  15.21  76.39  6.12  5.28  27.09  
2007 44.75  15.10  71.48  6.84  6.03  25.53  
2008 43.23  16.64  65.13  7.20  5.91  23.35  
2009 55.90  19.91  80.55  5.31  7.06  28.33  
2010 67.10  22.74  74.76  5.56  8.56  26.36  
2011 69.23  23.53  71.35  6.06  9.03  25.28  
2012 71.47    74.72  6.31  9.42  26.55  
2013 78.43    77.39  6.00  10.20  27.41  
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Table 7 Sustainable indicators for China’s external debt 
Period 
Total 
external 
Debt/GDP 
Total 
External 
debt/ 
Exports 
Total 
external 
debt/ 
government 
fiscal 
revenue 
Total external 
debt/foreign 
exchange  
Short-term 
external 
debt/ 
government 
fiscal 
revenue 
Short-term 
external 
debt/Exports 
Short-term 
debt/ 
foreign 
exchange 
reserves 
1985 5.62  62.65  25.28  1916.78        
1986 7.78  73.88  37.68  3858.62        
1987 9.32  76.47  51.11  3845.62        
1988 9.90  84.27  63.16  4415.30        
1989 11.48  99.70  73.18  3513.92        
1990 14.70  91.91  93.43  2473.82  2.30  2.27  60.99  
1991 15.11  85.99  104.49  1515.73  3.27  2.69  47.46  
1992 14.81  85.26  114.46  2050.69  3.11  2.32  55.75  
1993 13.72  91.72  111.45  2286.46  3.11  2.56  63.90  
1994 16.26  75.22  150.23  1518.58  2.00  1.00  20.18  
1995 14.58  71.20  142.03  1204.60  1.91  0.96  16.19  
1996 13.56  76.72  130.25  918.50  1.90  1.12  13.43  
1997 13.73  71.52  125.34  775.13  2.10  1.20  12.97  
1998 14.32  79.42  122.42  834.06  1.76  1.14  11.96  
1999 14.02  77.79  109.84  812.72  1.33  0.94  9.81  
2000 12.16  58.46  90.05  728.52  0.98  0.63  7.90  
2001 15.35  76.40  102.69  793.11  5.11  3.80  39.48  
2002 13.94  62.24  88.73  585.62  4.61  3.23  30.40  
2003 13.37  50.03  83.61  450.23  4.73  2.83  25.49  
2004 13.61  44.33  82.46  356.87  5.25  2.82  22.74  
2005 12.94  38.20  75.61  292.25  5.42  2.74  20.96  
2006 12.22  34.07  68.21  247.95  5.14  2.57  18.68  
2007 10.70  30.39  55.40  186.04  4.59  2.52  15.42  
2008 8.49  26.56  43.48  137.03  3.69  2.25  11.63  
2009 8.59  35.68  42.72  122.00  3.78  3.16  10.81  
2010 9.05  33.97  43.75  127.69  4.52  3.51  13.19  
2011 9.25  35.53  42.15  137.64  4.82  4.06  15.75  
2012 8.92  35.81  39.50  139.87  4.61  4.18  16.33  
2013 8.91  38.18  40.54  137.09  5.24  4.93  17.71  
 
 
